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THE WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL TORTURE MEMO: THE
FINAL PRODUCT OF A FLAWED SYSTEM
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imper-
illed if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example .... If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.... To declare that.., the
end justifies the means... would bring terrible retribution. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In describing abuse of his family by U.S. prison guards, a disabled
Iraqi man told U.S. Army investigators that guards pulled him around
by his penis and then sodomized him with a water bottle.2 His sister
reported that another brother was severely beaten; his bloody and
bruised body was then thrown into her cell, landing on top of her sis-
ter. I The man died shortly thereafter.' The family's allegations were
substantiated by a military contractor from CACI International Inc.'
The members of the family were detained and accused of supply-
ing arms to a paramilitary group loyal to Saddam Hussein and sub-
jected to torture by U.S. servicemen.6 The abuse occurred at the Ad-
hamiya Palace, one of Hussein's Baghdad villas, in 2004.7 In January
2005, the Pentagon released reports of abuse similar to this account
that occurred beyond those of Abu Ghraib, the U.S.-run detention cen-
ter in Iraq.'
1. Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 695 (2004) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
2. John Hendren, Pentagon Files Reveal More Allegations of Abuse in Iraq; Documents
Contain Descriptions of Severe Detainee Mistreatment Beyond Abu Ghraib, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
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Other reported abuse includes forced sodomy, electrical shock of
the testicles and other body parts,9 severe beatings, cigarette burns,
10
sexual humiliation," desecration of the Koran, 12 and water boarding.' 3
Torture has also resulted in two reported deaths in an Afghan jail. 14
9. See Sen. Kennedy Issues Statement on Anniversary of Abu Ghraib Scandal, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Apr. 26, 2005.
10. Id.
11. Id.; Paul Vitello, U.S. Policy Fosters Abuse, NEWSDAY, May 3, 2005, at A6.
12. Richard A. Serrano & John Daniszewski, Dozens Have Alleged Koran's Mishan-
dling, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2005, at Al (reporting abuse of the Koran at Guantanamo Bay,
Iraq, and Afghanistan). Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay staged a massive hunger strike when
reports of the desecration spread. Id. Detainees complained that soldiers tore the book into
pieces, urinated on the book, scrawled obscenities inside it, had a guard dog carry it around,
flushed it in the toilet, and threw it on the floor and used it as a carpet. Id. Abuse of the Ko-
ran was reported by Newsweek. James Rainey & Mark Mazzetti, Newsweek Retracts Its Arti-
cle on Koran, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at Al. The story instigated riots in the Middle East
that left 14 people dead. Id. After sharp criticism from the Bush Administration the article
was retracted. Id. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman called the article .' irresponsible'
and 'demonstrably false."' Id. The spokesman for the White House indicated that the News-
week article had "serious consequences" and that the "image of the United States abroad has
been damaged." Id. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld "said the news media needed to
be more careful." Id. However, less than two weeks later the Pentagon confirmed the al-
leged abuse of the Koran. Richard A. Serrano, Pentagon: Koran Defiled, L.A. TIMES, June 4,
2005, at Al. Regarding the incident of urination on the Koran, a guard acknowledged that
"[h]e had urinated near [a] vent, and the wind blew it into the vent, from which it splashed
into the cell" and onto the Koran. Eric Schmitt, Military Details Koran Incidents at Base in
Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at Al.
13. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary
Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 114. In this "novel interro-
gation method[]" called "water boarding," a prisoners is "immersed in water until he nearly
drowns." Id. This form of near-asphyxiation, or simulated drowning, creates the fear of
death in the prisoner and has traumatized victims for years. Id. One victim was unable to
take showers years later and "panicked when it rained." Id. at 112. Another account of abuse
was reported by FBI agents who witnessed female interrogators "forcibly squeeze male pris-
oners' genitals" and chain naked detainees "low to the floor for many hours." Neil A. Lewis,
Investigation Reportedly Finds Guantanamo Abuse, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 1, 2005, at
A6. Types of sexual humiliation include "forcing groups of... detainees to masturbate them-
selves while being photographed," "forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit
positions for photograph[s]," and "video-taping . .. naked male and female detainees" and
"keeping them naked for several days." U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 594-95 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2004). In order to soften up another
prisoner for interrogation, military officials made the man "pick plastic bottle caps out of a
drum" filled with feces and water. Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan
Inmates' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at Al.
14. Douglas Jehl, Army Details Scale of Abuse in Afghan Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2005, at Al. One of the reported deaths was a twenty-two-year-old taxi driver named Dila-
war. Golden, supra note 13. Dilawar was tortured for information relating to "a rocket attack
on an American base." Id. He was "chained by [his] wrists to the top of his cell for much of
the previous for four days." Id. His legs were beaten by guards for several days, to the point
they could no longer bend. Id. The most repugnant detail was that "[miost of the interroga-
2
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The detainees were chained to the ceiling and kicked and beaten by
American soldiers, resulting in death. 5 "At least 26 detainees have
died in American custody in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 in what
Army and Navy investigators have concluded or supect were acts of
criminal homicide ....
Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Alberto
R. Gonzales, as head of the White House Counsel (WHC), Iv drafted a
memorandum to the President (WHC Memo) interpreting the Geneva
Convention III on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). 8 The
GPW outlines the international law on acceptable treatment of prison-
ers of war and prohibits all forms of torture. 9 The WHC Memo,
along with others, provided legal justification for coercive interroga-
tion techniques used on U.S.-held detainees.20 The WHC Memo ar-
tors... believed Mr. Dilawar was an innocent man who simply drove his taxi past the Ameri-
can base at the wrong time." Id.
15. Jehl, supra note 14.
16. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military Says 26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homi-
cide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at Al; see Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Will Not Try 17 G.L's
Implicated in Prisoners' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at Al.
17. The scope of this Comment will be limited to the memorandum written by chief
WHC lawyer Alberto Gonzales and the role of the WHC in drafting it.
18. Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to George W.
Bush, President, United States, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prison-
ers of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter WHC
Memo].
19. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW].
20. See Neil A. Lewis, Documents Build a Case for Working Outside the Laws on Inter-
rogating Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2004, at A8 (describing several memos discussing
U.S. interrogation techniques and U.S. use of torture). Torture was justified under the guise
of preventing attacks against and providing safety for the American people. See id. However,
former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell argued in favor of applying the GPW to al Qaeda
and the Taiban, because not doing so would "reverse over a century of U.S. policy and prac-
tice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the laws of war
for our troops." Id. Torture by U.S. officials and acceptance of the practice of torture by the
current administration may lead to more human rights violations in other countries. Alan
Cowell, Amnesty Blasts U.S. over Human Rights Violations, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May
26, 2005, at A3. Human Rights Watch declared that some countries with "poor human rights
records are now 'citing the U.S. record to justify their own."' Id. Furthermore, Amnesty In-
ternational dubbed the Guantanamo Bay detention center, with over 400 inmates from over
forty countries, the "gulag of our times." Id. The example of U.S.-led torture will not make
the world a safer place. Terrorism is a product of hatred toward the United States; it cannot
fight terrorism with torture. Moreover, a senior Arab intelligence official stated that "'Guan-
tanamo is a huge problem for Americans' ..... 'Even those who were not hard-core extrem-
ists have... been taught to hate. If they let these people go, these people will make trouble."'
Tim Golden & Don Van Natta Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantanamo Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at Al (quoting a senior Arab intelligence official).
3
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gued the GPW's "strict limitations on questioning of enemy prison-
ers" were "obsolete."'" While the WHC Memo focused on the appli-
cation of the GPW to al Qaeda and the Taliban,22 there is a strong con-
sensus that the abuse in Iraq resulted from the torture techniques
approved for use against al Qaeda and the Taliban.23 Thus, the WHC
Memo was a legal opinion to the President and was part of the legal
framework24 for "routine" U.S.-conducted torture against enemies in
the war against terrorism and the war in Iraq.25
While the WHC is responsible for interpreting the law for the
President, the WHC is unable to provide legally sound advice because
the ethical duties of the WHC are in constant tension. The Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility require, among other duties, in-
dependent and objective legal advice from the WHC. 26 However, loy-
alty to the President and his policies often trumps these ethical duties,
21. WHC Memo, supra note 18.
22. See, e.g., id.
23. John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26; Editorial,
The Roots of Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2004, at A22; Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at
689, 691. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Green-
berg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
24. Barry et al., supra note 23 ("Bush administration created a bold legal framework to
justify this system of interrogation .... ).
25. See, e.g., Mark Danner, We Are all Torturers Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A27
("[A] path the Bush Administration set.., has transformed the United States from a country
that condemned torture and forbade its use to one that practices torture routinely .... Shortly
after the 9/11 attacks, Americans began torturing prisoners, and they have never really
stopped."); see also Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 689-90; Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power
to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J.
503 (2003). See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 23; Matthew Segal, Advocate or
Counselor? Alberto Gonzales' Promotion Following His Torture Memo Raises Important
Questions on Government Lawyering, RECORDER, Mar. 25, 2005, at 4; Lewis, supra note 20;
U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, supra note 13, at 593; Mark Bowden,
Lessons ofAbu Ghraib, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1, 2004, at 37. Amnesty International, cit-
ing the record of U.S. abuse of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the Guan-
tanamo Bay detention center in Cuba, has sharply criticized the Bush Administration for
"condoning 'atrocious' human rights violations, thereby diminishing its moral authority and
setting a global example encouraging abuse by other nations." Cowell, supra note 20, at A3.
The Bush Administration has often called the detainees in Guantanamo Bay the world's most
dangerous terrorists or, in Vice-President Dick Cheney's words, "the worst of a very bad lot."
Golden & Van Natta, supra note 20. This apparently includes several minors--the exact
number is unknown because the military has sought to conceal the precise number of juve-
niles held-including a boy who was captured when he was 14. Neil A. Lewis, Some Held at
Guantanamo Are Minors, Lawyers Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2005. While at Guantanamo the
14 year old boy was regularly beaten, hung by his wrists for hours, and given cigarette burns.
Id.
26. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
4
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leaving only inaccurate legal advice that furthers the interests of the
President 7.2  The WHC Memo is an example of how political pres-
sures hinder good legal advice to the detriment of the public interest,
the ultimate client of the WHC. In order for the WHC to render accu-
rate legal advice to the President, it must be freed from political pres-
sures. The United States should follow the example of New Zealand's
Crown Law Office, an independent department, which advises its re-
spective executive branch. 28 The WHC will not be able to fulfill its
mandated ethical duties and provide sound impartial legal advice to
the President unless it is an independent office free from inherent con-
flicts of interest.
Part II of this Comment will focus on the responsibilities and ethi-
cal duties of the WHC in a lawyer-client relationship. Part III will de-
scribe the ethical duties of the WHC that are in constant tension and
examine rules of professional responsibility pertinent to advising cli-
ents. The ethical violations committed while preparing the WHC
Memo will be examined in Part IV. The final part will propose a solu-
tion of creating an independent legal advisory agency to the executive
branch, such as exists in New Zealand, which may avoid the inherent
problems of the political pressures of the WHC.
II. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE WHC IN A
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
To understand the ethical duties and responsibilities of the WHC,
it is necessary to first identify the client of the WHC. The characteri-
zation of the client is important in defining to whom the WHC owes
its loyalty and diligence. This next section will define the client of the
WHC and illuminate the WHC's duties.
A. Duties and Responsibilities of the WHC
The WHC was created in the 1940s by President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt.29 The WHC was intended to be the President's general assis-
tant, who would handle various internal legal questions.30 The duties
of the WHC remain ambiguous and are simply, as one recent WHC
27. See infra Part 1I.
28. See infra Part V.
29. Jennifer Wang, Raising the Stakes at the White House: Legal and Ethical Duties of
the White House Counsel, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 115, 118 (1994).
30. Ronald Goldfarb, Counsel of Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at A15.
2005]
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lawyer stated, "what the President wants."31 The duties of the WHC
have changed depending upon the wishes of the sitting President.32
The WHC's general duties include "reviewing legislation and Presi-
dential statements, overseeing Presidential appointments, and handling
pardons."33
When a former WHC lawyer to Lyndon B. Johnson was asked
what guidelines he followed when serving the President, the WHC
lawyer responded, "[n]ot many. '3 4 The WHC laywer for Richard M.
Nixon was asked the same question, and he responded, "[n]ext to
none. It was an existential nightmare-fuzzy, obscure, intuitive. 3 5
More recently, WHC lawyers for President George H.W. Bush have
taken a greater role in the reshaping of public policy.36
The WHC has few mandated duties, but most importantly, it must
keep the President happy.37 The relationship between the President
and his "lawyers ha[s] long been a bone of contention. Andrew Jack-
son told Attorney General Roger Taney to solve a problem the way he
wanted 'or I will find an Attorney General who will.' ' 38 The loose
guidelines of the WHC, combined with a strong incentive to please the
client, may lead to dangerous loyalty and conflicts of interest.3 9
B. The Client of the WHC
There are problems in identifying the client of the WHC, which
can lead to frustration in fulfilling the duties of the WHC.4° A lawyer
of the WHC has been commonly "known as the President's lawyer. 41
However, legally, "the President's 'official' lawyer is... the Attorney
General of the United States. 42 The Attorney General represents the
31. Id.
32. Wang, supra note 29, at 118-19.
33. Id. at 119.
34. Goldfarb, supra note 30.
35. Id.
36. Wang, supra note 29, at 120.
37. Naftali Bendavid, White House Counsel: The Job that Pits Ethics Against Reality,
RECORDER, Mar. 14, 1994, at 1.
38. Goldfarb, supra note 30. While President Jackson was referring specifically to the
then Attorney General, his statement reflects one President's view toward the President's law-
yers in general.
39. See Bendavid, supra note 37. See generally John W. Dean, Watergate: What Was
It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 621 (2000); Goldfarb, supra note 30.
40. See generally Wang, supra note 29.
41. Anthony S. Alperin, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the White House Counsel,
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entire executive branch of the federal government, requires Senate ap-
proval of his or her appointment, and must testify to congressional
committees concerning the administration of his or her department.43
In contrast, a WHC lawyer is differentiated from the Attorney General
in that he or she does not need Senate approval for appointment, and
executive privilege forbids testifying to the Senate concerning the ad-
ministration of the WHC. 4
To properly establish the role and responsibilities of the WHC, it
must be determined whether the client of the WHC is the President,
the office of the Presidency, or the federal government as a whole.
The federal government draws all of its power from the people, and
therefore all government employees are accountable to the people. 45
Each government agency has the obligation to perform its duties in
furtherance of the public interest consistent with the Constitution and
the laws of the land.46
However, it may be impractical for the WHC to represent the pub-
lic interest as a client.47 It is difficult to determine what actually is in
the public interest in any situation because there are many different
concepts of public interest.48 Further, placing a WHC lawyer in the
position to serve the public interest may conflict with our democratic
system in which the role of the WHC is an advocate for the executive
branch.49 In our democracy, with its separation of powers, the Presi-
dent has a "substantial interest in maintaining the powers of the execu-
tive branch."5 Congress and the judiciary both have means of pro-
tecting their own constitutional authority.51 Similarly, the executive
branch must have a legal advocate to "protect the powers of the execu-
tive branch from encroachment by Congress or the judiciary. '52 The
43. Id.
44. Id. at 208-09.
45. Wang, supra note 29, at 121.
46. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
47. Wang, supra note 29, at 122.
48. Id.; Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1294-95 (1987).
49. Miller, supra note 48, at 1296; see Wang, supra note 29, at 124.
50. Wang, supra note 29, at 124.
51. Id. at 125. Congress may check the power of the President by exercising the "pow-
ers of the purse, oversight investigation, and impeachment." Id. at 124. Congress can also
override a presidential veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The judiciary has the power to de-
cide the cases that comes before them, and they have the authority "to order the executive
branch to take or refrain from taking specific actions." Wang, supra note 29, at 124. The at-
torney for the President must protect the interests of the President to properly maintain the
power of the President in our system of checks and balances. Id. at 124-25.
52. Id. at 125; see also Miller, supra note 48, at 1296.
2005] 155
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attorney for the executive branch serves the interests of the decision-
making authority, which is the President in his official capacity.53 If
the President's policies are not upheld, then the President's policy-
making and constitutional powers will be diminished.54
Nevertheless, the government lawyer is obligated, by rules gov-
erning his professional responsibility, to look beyond the relationship
with the client and serve the public interest, which is the goal of all
governmental agencies.5 Each officer of the executive branch must
take an oath to uphold the cause of the Constitution.56 "Unlike a pri-
vate practitioner, the loyalties of a government lawyer therefore can-
not and must not lie solely with his or her client agency. '57 The WHC
must consider the interest of the public while representing the Presi-
dent.58
III. ETHICAL DUTIES OF THE WIC IN CONSTANT TENSION
A WHC lawyer is a political officer who is charged with interpret-
ing the law and is accountable only to the President. 59 This leaves the
WHC lawyer in a precarious situation where he must interpret the law
while facing constant pressure to deliver legal advice that furthers the
position of his client, the President.6" This next part will describe the
ethical duties of the WHC that may be difficult to meet and the rules
pertinent to advising clients.
53. See Wang, supra note 29, at 125; Micheal S. Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets, and Gov-
ernment Lawyers: The Duty of Loyalty and Its Limits, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85
(1998).
54. See Wang, supra note 29, at 125.
55. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see Segal, supra note 25
("Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government lawyer... cannot and must not
lie solely with his or her client agency.").
56. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1108.
57. Id.; see also Segal, supra note 25.
58. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1109; see Wang, supra note 29, at 125.
59. See Segal, supra note 25. A WHC lawyer knows "that no police officers will swoop
down on the president if, following your advice, he treads upon or crosses a legal boundary."
ld. "Government lawyers may likewise be shielded from penalties." Id. Thus, without over-
sight by anyone other than the President himself, there are essentially no other checks on the
WHC.
60. The WHC is the lawyer for the "Presidency" as a whole and not the President indi-
vidually. Bendavid, supra note 37.
8
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A. Selected Ethical Duties of the WHC
This section will describe the ethical duties that are uniquely im-
portant to the WHC. These duties pull in opposite directions and may
be compromised without careful attention and diligence by the WHC
lawyer. 6' Lawyers of the WHC are subject to disciplinary rules in the
states where they are licensed to practice and must perform the duties
set forth by their respective state bars.62
1. Duty to the Client
The first and most important duty of any lawyer is to advance the
position of the client. 63 A lawyer who prejudices or damages the posi-
tion of his client is subject to discipline. 64 The lawyer must use his or
her best judgment solely for the benefit of the client, "within the
bounds of the law," and free from external influences and loyalties.65
The WHC lawyer has an ethical obligation to follow the client's
instructions. 66 The comment to Rule 1.2 of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (Model Rules) states that "[t]he client has the ulti-
mate authority to determine the purpose to be served by legal repre-
sentation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's
professional obligations. ' 67 The WHC must adhere to the objectives
and interests of the client, pursue these objectives with vigor, and use
all available legal resources to accomplish these goals.6 8
61. Bendavid, supra note 37.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2005).
63. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1983).
64. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(3)(1980). A lawyer may be
subjected to various degrees of discipline for violating rules or statutes. RICHARD C. WYDICK
ET AL., CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS 45 (4th ed. 2003). The mildest form of discipline is private
or public reprimand. Id. A lawyer who receives a public reprimand will usually have their
name published in a publication aimed only for attorneys, but in some cases the public press.
Id. The reprimand severs as discipline and education for other attorneys. Id. Suspension is a
harsher form of punishment, and the lawyer is prohibited from practicing law for several
months or even a term of years. Id. The most severe form of discipline is disbarment, which
typically entails a permanent ban from practicing law. Id. Other forms of punishment include
having to re-take the legal ethics bar examination. Id.
65. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 951, 962 (1991) (cit-
ing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980)).
66. Wang, supra note 29, at 132.
67. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (1983)).
68. Lanctot, supra note 65, at 964.
9
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2. Duty of Zealous Advocacy
The Model Rules require lawyers to zealously advocate for the
position of their client.69 Zealous advocacy is traditionally viewed as
requiring the "single-minded devotion to a client's interests."70 The
WHC lawyer must represent his client with zeal, and in doing so use
any legal theory or argument to advance the position of his client.7
WHC lawyers do not have free reign under the guise of zealous advo-
cacy and loyalty, but rather, must balance their zealous representation
with their other ethical duties.7"
However, zealous advocacy is inappropriate for governmental
lawyers; they must temper their representation and advocate for the
interests of justice.73 In fact, the WHC lawyer is required to seek just
results.74 Thus, the WHC lawyer, at times, must not follow the in-
structions of the client, but instead pursue just results.75
3. Duty to Remain Objective and Independent
A lawyer must zealously advocate for the position of the client,
but when a lawyer may formulate wide-reaching policy, the duty to
remain objective and independent is equally important.76 The WHC
advises the President on the legality of his national and foreign poli-
cies. The lawyer, in turn, has a substantial influence in formulating
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (1983). While outside the scope of
this Comment, a group of lawyers have been unable to meet their mandated ethical duties be-
cause of the Bush Administration's choice not to apply the GPW to prisoners in the War
against Terrorism. Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Committee, Op.
03-04 (2003). The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and military lawyers
defending suspects in the War against Terrorism at Guantanamo Bay have complained of
their inability to fulfill their ethical duty to zealously represent their clients because a military
commission restricted the GPW's application to those prisoners. Id. The lawyers argue that
the government, despite constitutional limitations and other domestic laws, imposed severe
and unreasonable limitations on those prisoner's rights, and that they were unable to provide
effective or ethical representation. Id. See generally id. (providing an interesting discussion
on the military lawyer's ethical dilemma).
70. Lanctot, supra note 65, at 954.
71. Id. at 955.
72. Raymark Industries, Inc.v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *18 (D.
Kan. 1990).
73. See Lanctot, supra note 65, at 955.
74. Id. at 957 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980)).
75. See id. at 955-57 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal
Op. 342 (1975) (recognizing that Canon 7 states "the duty of all government lawyers [is] to
seek just results rather than the result desired by a client")).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
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policy.77 Therefore, WHC lawyers have an additional responsibility to
the public when formulating public policy to ensure the policies are
legally sound and fair.78
Institutions that formulate public policy require the most effective
decision-making processes because their decisions affect all citizens.7 9
Effective policy decisions can only be made after the lawyer has fully
researched the problem, critically applied objective independent
judgment, and provided the client with unbiased legal advice.8" The
ability of the WHC lawyer to reshape public policy is justified only if
the lawyer fulfills his ethical duty to render objective and independent
legal advice.81 Problems may arise with advising on the legality of
public policy when the lawyer only applies objectivity "when it affects
another party adversely.- 8
2
When determining the legality of public policy, there is an inher-
ent conflict of interest for the WHC lawyer.83 To ensure legal validity,
objectivity is a crucial ethical quality necessary to participate in for-
mulating policy. 84 To render objective counsel, a lawyer must be un-
influenced by biases or prejudices and detached from the views of the
client.85
The WHC lawyer is required by Model Rule 2.1 to "exercise in-
dependent professional judgment and render candid advice."86  The
WHC lawyer must be prepared to give straightforward and objective
advice to the client, even if the advice does not further the client's pol-
icy goals.87 The Model Rules require the lawyer to fully analyze all
77. See Wang, supra note 29, at 120.
78. See Steven H. Leleiko, Professional Responsibility and Public Policy Formation, 49
ALB. L. REv. 403, 417 (1985).
79. See id. at 427.
80. See id.
81. "The duty to exercise independent judgment is the cornerstone of the lawyer's re-
sponsibilities. Fulfilling this responsibility justifies the powers and privileges that lawyers
possess." Leleiko, supra note 78, at 427. Recent administrations have given the WHC the
privilege of influencing public policy. Wang, supra note 29, at 120. Therefore, this power
and privilege is only justified if the WHC lawyer fulfills the ethical duty to render objective
and independent legal advice.
82. Id.
83. Seeid. at411.
84. Id. at 409-10.
85. Id. at 411.
86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. (1983).
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aspects of the client's situation and provide the client with candid le-
gal advice, even if that advice is contrary to what the client wants.88
B. Ethical Rules Pertinent to Advising Clients
The Model Rules define professional misconduct in Rule 8.. 89
The Rule provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tation."9° A recent ABA formal opinion discussing Rule 8.4 declared
the Rule prohibited a "broad" range of conduct.9' Furthermore, the
Rule shall apply generally to all aspects of the lawyer's professional
obligations and activities. 9 Thus, all client correspondence, legal rep-
resentations, statements of law, and advice to clients must not be dis-
honest or misrepresent the law, or the lawyer may be subject to disci-
pline under the Model Rules.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)
states that an attorney must represent the client "within the bounds of
the law." 93 A lawyer must zealously advocate for the client, but to
stay within the bounds of the law, he must not "[k]nowingly advance a
claim.., that is [not supported by] existing law."94 A lawyer cannot
advance a claim contrary to existing law without a good faith justifica-
tion seeking modification or reversal. 95 Further, a lawyer shall not
"knowingly make a false statement of law or fact." 96 "A false opinion
is one which ignores or minimizes serious legal risks or misstates
the.., law ... knowingly or through gross incompetence." 97 A law-
yer may violate the rules by recklessly failing to disclose applicable
law pertinent to the legal advice tendered to the client. 98 Thus, the
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983). "[A] lawyer should not be de-
terred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the cli-
ent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. (1983); see also Bilder & Vagts, supra
note 1, at 692.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983).
90. Id.
91. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-433 (2004).
92. Id.
93. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7 (1980).
94. MODEL CODE OF PROF' L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980) ("In his representation of
a client, a lawyer shall not: . . .Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported
by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.").
95. Id.
96. Id.
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ethical rules are clear that a lawyer zealously advocating for his client
cannot make any claim or representation that advances the position of
his client, unless it is grounded in existing law. 99
Further, the Model Rules forbid a lawyer from counseling a client
or assisting a client to violate or evade the law.l°° A lawyer may ren-
der an honest opinion on the lawfulness and the legal consequences
that may flow from the client's proposed conduct.'0 1 However, re-
gardless of the actions taken by the client, a lawyer must never coun-
sel a client to violate the law.102 Thus, a lawyer must walk a fine line
between delivering advice of the possible legal consequences of the
client's conduct and rendering an analysis on how the client may en-
gage in unlawful conduct with impunity.
When advising a client on the legality of proposed conduct, the
lawyer is held to a good-faith standard in determining the application
of the law. 103 If "there is no 'substantial authority' in support of the
position," a lawyer may advise a client as to the legality of proposed
conduct if there is a good faith basis for doing so.'" Thus, the lawyer
must believe in good faith that the position of the client is warranted
under existing law or there is a valid reason for the law's extension or
modification.0 5 A good faith position requires the "realistic possibil-
ity of success if the matter is litigated," and the lawyer must advise the
client of the "potential penalties and other legal consequences" if the
client chooses the proposed conduct.0 6
IV. ETHICAL VIOLATIONS OF THE WHC MEMO: A PRODUCT OF
INHERENT FLAWS IN THE WHC
The political pressures exerted on the WHC can inhibit the institu-
tion from delivering sound and accurate legal advice.0 7 This pressure
99. See MODEL CODE OF PROF' L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,
but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law."); see Paulsen, supra note 53, at 86.
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983).
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Bendavid, supra note 37 ("Because a sound legal decision can be a political disas-
ter, the presidential counsel constantly sacrifices legal ground for political advantage.").
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resulted in WHC advice regarding the treatment of prisoners that was
driven by loyalty to the President rather than adherence to the law. 108
This part of the Comment will examine the advice rendered in the
WHC Memo, illustrate the ethical violations of the WHC in drafting
the memo, and discuss the inherent flaws of the WHC.
A. The WHC Memo Contains Legally Unsound Provisions
On January 25, 2002, Alberto R. Gonzales wrote President Bush a
memorandum, under the authority of the.WHC, concerning the "Ap-
plication of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Con-
flict with al Qaeda and the Taliban."' 9 The WHC Memo advised the
President of the ramifications of his decision not to apply the GPW to
al Qaeda and the Taliban.11° Gonzales provided the legal background
and the positive and negative consequences if the GPW was not ap-
plied to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban."' Finally, Gonza-
les provided the President with the "Responses to the Arguments for
Applying the GPW to al Qaeda and the Taliban."112
1. The President Does Not Have the Constitutional Authority to
Violate the Law
The WHC Memo stated that the President has the constitutional
authority to evade international and domestic laws relating to the hu-
man rights of prisoners of war. 3 Gonzales advised the President that
he had the "constitutional authority to make the determination" not to
apply the GPW to captured terrorists in the war against terrorism.11 4
This WHC legal opinion directly contradicted the Constitution's ex-
press grants of power to Congress and a landmark Supreme Court de-
108. See Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 691-93 ("[T]he Gonzales memo was legally
inept."); Jordan Paust, The Common Plan to Violate the Geneva Conventions (May 25, 2004),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/paust2.php.
109. WHC Memo, supra note 18. A draft memo was prepared on January 25, 2002.
Because there is limited availability to WHC documents, it is unclear when the actual memo








California Western Law Review, Vol. 42 [2005], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol42/iss1/5
2005] THE WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL TORTURE MEMO 163
cision."'5 The legal justification Gonzales provided the President for
suspending the GPW for captured terrorists is "legally untenable." 16
First, Article I of the Constitution provides the framework for the
legislature and expressly grants Congress powers separate from the
executive branch.'17 Specifically, section eight gives Congress the
power to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," '' to
"define and punish ... [o]ffences against the Law of Nations," '119 and
"[t1o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces."' 120
Second, the Supreme Court rejected presidential authority to ig-
nore domestic laws and the Constitution during war times in the
landmark decision Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.121 In this
case, President Truman issued an executive order during the Korean
War directing the seizure of certain steel companies to prevent a
strike.122 The executive branch argued the order was valid under the
President's power while acting as Commander-in-Chief. 23 The Court
held that the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive authority to
seize private property for public use and Presidential action pursuant
to this exclusive power is unconstitutional. 124
However, John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General when
the WHC Memo was written and currently a law professor at Berke-
ley,125 concurs with the WHC's opinion that the President has the
115. Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 690-91; see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that the President's military power does not extend
past express constitutional grants of exclusive authority to Congress, such as seizures of pub-
lic property). The Constitution expressly grants Congress the exclusive authority to make
rules concerning captures on land and water. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Accordingly, the
WHC and the executive branch do not have the authority to reshape public policy concerning
captures on land and water.
116. Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 690. See Lawyers' Statement on Bush Admini-
stration's Torture Memos (Aug. 4, 2004) (statement written to the administration about the
ethical violations of the torture memos signed by several hundred lawyers, law professors,
judges, and other high ranking legal professionals), http://www.allianceforjustice.
org/spotlight/collection/spotlight-statementO8O4. html [hereinafter Lawyers' Statement]; see
also Edward Alden, Dismay at Attempt to Find Legal Justification for Torture, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 10, 2004, at 7.
117. U.S. CoNST. art. I.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
121. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
122. Id. at 582.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 588.
125. Mayer, supra note 13, at 112; Alden, supra note 116.
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power to override the GPW. 126 Yoo argues the President has the "ple-
nary power" to override a U.N. convention if he is acting as Com-
mander-in-Chief and in defense of the country.1 27 Yoo contends that
"Congress doesn't have the power to 'tie the President's hands in re-
gard to torture as an interrogation technique.' . . . 'It's the core of the
Commander-in-Chief function. They can't prevent the President from
ordering torture.' ' 128  Yoo argues the constitutional remedy for an
abuse of this unfettered presidential power is provided by the im-
peachment power of Congress. 129 If the President oversteps his au-
thority, then he may be impeached. 130
Nonetheless, the WHC advice that the President has the authority
to make the determination not to apply the GPW to captured terrorists
is not legally sound. 3' Yoo's arguments do not save the legality of
the advice. Many scholars disagree with his contention, because his
logic is unpersuasive and suffers from the same flaws as the WHC's
opinion. 132 As stated above, Congress has the exclusive constitutional
authority to establish rules regulating "Captures on Land and Water,..
• define and punish... Offences against the Law of nations, and...
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces."1 33 Congress ratified the GPW in 1955,134 and the GPW regu-
lates treatment of prisoners of war, 135 defines torture, and provides
rules for all nations concerning armed forces. 13 6 According to the ex-
press grants of power in the Constitution, the President does not have
the constitutional authority to regulate captures on land and water, and
126. Mayer, supra note 13, at 112-14 (quoting John C. Yoo).
127. Id. at 114.
128. Id. (quoting John C. Yoo).
129. Id.
130. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 6.
131. Alden, supra note 116, at 7 (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Dean of Yale Law
School and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State); Paust, supra note 108; Lawyers' State-
ment, supra note 116, at 1.
132. See Mayer, supra note 13, at 114 (discussing the many criticisims of the controver-
sial memos and the legal analysis and conclusions supporting it); Alden, supra note 116, at 7
(discussing several criticisms of the government lawyers responsible for the controversial
memos).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
134. GPW, supra note 19.
135. Article 13 of the GPW states that prisoners of war "must at all times be humanely
treated," and article 17 adds that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coer-
cion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind what-
ever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." Id. at arts. 13, 17.
136. See generally GPW, supra note 19.
[Vol. 42
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may not suspend the GPW to captured terrorist. The precedent of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. holds that the President does not have
the authority to act in a role expressly granted to Congress. Therefore,
according to the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, since
Congress ratified the GPW, the President does not have the authority
to suspend the GPW.
2. The GPW Does Apply to al Qaeda and the Taliban
The legal opinion that the GPW does not apply to al Qaeda and
the Taliban is legally unsupportable because every person is protected
by the Geneva Conventions. 3 In the memo, the WHC stated that "the
war against terrorism is a new kind of war."' 13 8 This new type of war,
it continued, places a premium on the ability to obtain information
quickly from captured terrorists to avoid further attacks on the Ameri-
can people.13 9 Moreover, according to the WHC, "this new paradigm
renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy
prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.""'' The WHC
supported this opinion on the following grounds:
Afghanistan was a failed state because the Taliban did not exercise
full control over the territory and people, was not recognized by the
137. Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116 ("[Tjhe treaty . . . protects even unlawful
combatants who do not qualify as prisoners of war .... "), at 1; see also Bilder & Vagts, su-
pra note 1, at 690; Mayer, supra note 13, at 114 ("There is no such thing as a non-covered
person under the Geneva Conventions." (quoting a former State Department lawyer)); Paust,
supra note 25, at 511-12.
138. WHC Memo, supra note 18, at 2.
139. Id. The WHC and the Bush Administration claim that coercive interrogation tech-
niques are needed to gain information quickly. Id. However, long time F.B.I. and C.I.A.
agents have stated that torture does not provide reliable information. Meyer, supra note 12, at
112, 116. Torturers are able to get confessions, but the confessions are rarely accurate. Id. at
116. The victims will confess to crimes simply to stop the torture. See id. at 112. The agents
claim that physical torture is not a productive interrogation method and suggest that if detain-
ees are provided a lawyer, detainees are more likely to cooperate because the lawyer can as-
sist them in receiving a shorter sentence. Id Dan Coleman, an ex-F.B.I. agent, said it best:
"The lawyers show these guys there's a way out .... It's human nature. People don't coop-
erate with you unless they have some reason to .... Brutalization doesn't work. We know
that. Besides, you lose your soul." Id. (quoting Dan Coleman, former F.B.I. agent). For
more on the value of information produced from torture, and an excellent article on the U.S.
practice of sending detainees to other countries that will torture for the United States, see gen-
erally id. Donald Rumsfeld has often cited the importance of the interrogations at Guan-
tanamo Bay, but military officials have stated that "the Guantanamo detainees have provided
only a trickle of intelligence with current value," with the best information resulting from a
reward system, not torture. Golden & Van Natta, supra note 20.
140. WHC Memo, supra note 18, at 2.
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international community, and was not capable of fulfilling its inter-
national obligations ...[and] the Taliban and its forces were, in
fact, not a government, but a militant, terrorist-like group.' 4'
The WHC's argument that Afghanistan was a "failed state" is in-
consistent with the official position of the United States. 142 William
Taft IV, the State Department's legal advisor, maintains the official
position of the United States has been that "before, during, and after
the emergence of the Taliban, . . . Afghanistan constituted a state. 143
Furthermore, the United States has "held Afghanistan to its treaty ob-
ligations and identified it as a party to the Geneva Conventions."'"
There is no category of persons on the globe that is not covered
and protected by the Geneva Conventions. 145 The GPW shields fight-
ers in every type of conflict, "from world wars to local rebellions."' 46
The GPW by its own terms and conditions "governs all conflicts 'at
any time and in any place whatsoever.'"147 The GPW protects unlaw-
ful combatants that are not considered prisoners of war 148 and applies
to all people whether they are prisoners of war or not. 149 Anyone who
is detained, regardless of status, is afforded protection under the Ge-
neva Conventions and other relevant international law. 150  Therefore,
any human being who is detained, whether he is a prisoner of war, or-
dinary citizen, "unprivileged belligerent," or even a terrorist, must be
afforded the protections of the GPW. '51
141. Id. at 1.
142. Mayer, supra note 13, at 112.
143. Id.; see also Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to Counsel to the President in
THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 124.
144. Powell, supra note 143.
145. Mayer, supra note 13, at 114; see also Paust, supra note 25, at 511-12; Lawyers'
Statement, supra note 116, at 1.
146. Mayer, supra note 13, at 114.
147. Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 1 (quoting GPW, supra note 19, art. 3
para. 1). Colin Powell, acting as Secretary of State, submitted a memo to the President and
argued against the WHC memo stating that "[tihe United States has never determined that the
GPW did not apply to an armed conflict in which its forces have been engaged." Powell, su-
pra note 143, at 125. Moreover, addressing the argument that the GPW does not apply to il-
legal combatants, Powell stated that the "GPW was intended to cover all types of armed con-
flicts and did not by its terms limit its application." Id. at 122-25.
148. Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 1; see also Paust, supra note 25, at 511-12;
Mayer, supra note 13, at 112-14.
149. Paust, supra note 108.
150. Id.
151. Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law
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The WHC's legal opinion that captured members of al Qaeda and
the Taliban are illegal enemy combatants not covered by the GPW has
been defended by Yoo. 5 2 He compares members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban to pirates and slave traders who were not fighting on behalf of
any nation.153 Yoo argues pirates and the Taliban are people who are
so bad they do not deserve the protection of the GPW.154 For support,
Yoo relies upon the Lincoln assassination, where the assassins were
tried before a military court and subsequently executed.155
However, neither the WHC's nor Yoo's basis for the choice not to
apply the GPW to al Qaeda and the Taliban is legally supportable.156
First, the WHC's argument that Afghanistan is a failed state is directly
contradictory to the official position of the United States. 57  Second,
the United States was unmistakably involved in an international armed
conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan, 158 triggering the application
of the GPW.159 Third, notwithstanding Yoo's arguments, the language
of the GPW clearly covers all people; thus, even unlawful combatants
are included in the provisions of the GPW. "60 Therefore, the legal
opinion of the WHC furnished to the President regarding his decision
not to apply the GPW to al Qaeda and the Taliban is not legally sound.




156. See Paust, supra note 108; Mayer, supra note 13, at 112; Lawyers' Statement, su-
pra note 116, at 1; Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 690.
157. Mayer, supra note 13, at 112; see also Powell, supra note 143, at 124.
158. Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1,5(2001).
159. Id.; Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 1.
160. Regardless of a detainees' POW status, the detainee is still covered under the
GPW.
During an armed conflict, all persons who are not POWs, including so-called un-
privileged or "unlawful combatants," have at least various nonderogable rights to
due process under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (the 'Geneva Civilian Convention') and the first Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions ("Geneva Protocol F'). Thus, even if POW
status is somehow lost, any detainee has due process protections under the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I, human rights law, and other international laws as
noted herein. In case of doubt as to the status of an accused criminal or detainee,
the Geneva POW Convention requires that all persons having committed a bellig-
erent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy shall enjoy POW protec-
tions until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
Paust, supra note 25, at 511-12 (internal quotations omitted).
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3. U.S. Officials May Not Escape Liability for War Crimes Against
the Taliban
The WHC Memo also contains legal advice on how U.S. officials
may violate international law and domestic criminal law with impu-
nity. 6' The memo illustrates a common plan to evade and violate in-
ternational and domestic law. 162 In the memo, Gonzales counsels the
President that holding the GPW inapplicable to al Qaeda and the Tali-
ban "[s]ubstantially reduces the threat of domestic criminal prosecu-
tion under the War Crimes Act." '163 The War Crimes Act (WCA) de-
fines a "war crime" as a "grave breach in any of the international
conventions signed at Geneva," including the GPW, and applies to
any "member of the Armed Forces" or U.S. national inside or outside
the United States." Punishment for a violation of the WCA may be
imprisonment for life, and if death results from the violation, then the
offender shall be subject to the death penalty. 165
To avoid prosecution for war crimes, the WHC opined that "[a]
determination that the GPW is not applicable to the Taliban would
mean that [the WCA] would not apply to actions taken with respect to
the Taliban."'' 66 Gonzales elaborated and advised the President that
holding the GPW inapplicable "would create a reasonable basis in law
that [the WCA] does not apply."' 67 Furthermore, this would provide a
valid defense to any domestic prosecution for war crimes. 168
Gonzales created the legal framework and advised the President
on how U.S. servicemen and nationals could avoid domestic prosecu-
tion for war crimes. 69 The advice given to the President was designed
to avoid criminal liability. 70 By simply holding the GPW inapplica-
ble, U.S. serviceman and nationals may torture without being exposed
161. "Some critics charged that the memoranda ... propos[ed] arguments to protect
those involved in coercive interrogation from potential prosecution under U.S. law." Bilder &
Vagts, supra note 1, at 691. "A series of memorandums from the Justice Department... pro-
vided arguments to keep United States officials from being charged with war crimes for the
way prisoners were detained and interrogated." Lewis, supra note 20.
162. See Paust, supra note 108.
163. WHC Memo, supra note 18.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2005).
165. Id.
166. WHC Memo, supra note 18.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Neil A. Lewis, Justice Memos Explained How to Skip Prisoners Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A10; Lewis, supra note 20.
170. Lewis, supra note 20.
[Vol. 42
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to the WCA. 171' If the GPW does not apply, then it cannot be violated.
Gonzales created a defense for any serviceman charged with a war
crime. 7 2 This defense did not exist before the WHC's advice to the
President. Gonzales' advice is similar to finding loopholes to avoid
criminal liability.173 Now U.S. officials and nationals might not be
held legally accountable for any war crimes committed against the
Taliban. 74 Accordingly, the WHC has advised the President on how
to evade and violate domestic and international law.
B. The WHC Memo Contains Ethical Violations
The legal opinions in the WHC Memo were products of excessive
loyalty to the President.'75 The WHC delivered to the President the
legal advice he wanted to hear. 76 The legal justification for torture re-
sulted from "too much advocacy, and not enough counsel." 177 Pre-
sumably, the WHC of the Bush Administration was asked to provide
legal justification for torture. The WHC rendered advice that the
President wanted; however, it did not fulfill the WHC's ethical duty to
deliver candid legal advice, even if that advice was contrary to the cli-
ent's interest.' 78 This resulted in legal misinterpretations and legally
unsound policies. 179
The WHC Memo was born from excessive loyalty. 180 Once the
opinion was no longer politically tenable, the memo was repudiated
and the legal advice was no longer deemed accurate. 8' The memo
171. Id.
172. Lewis, supra note 169.
173. See id.
174. Army investigators who discovered that U.S. servicemen had killed detainees in an
Afghan jail charged the men with homicide. See Jehl & Schmitt, supra note 16. However, if
the domestic criminal law of the WCA had applied to the killings, then the torturers would
have been subjected to the prosecution for war crimes because they engaged in torture and
death resulted from torture. This raises the question of whether the servicemen were able to
evade the domestic criminal law of the WCA. See Jehl & Schmitt, supra note 16.
175. See Segal, supra note 25 ("The critics were probably right to identify loyalty as a
driving force behind Gonzales' conduct.").
176. See id. (noting Gonzales critics' belief that "Gonzales had simply provided Bush
with the legal opinions Bush wanted").
177. Matthew Segal, More Than Yes Men, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 66.
178. A lawyer has a duty to render candid advice, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 2.1, even if that advice is "unpalatable to the client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 2.1 cmt.; see also Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 692.
179. See Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 1-3; Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at
690-91, 693; Mayer, supra note 13, at 112-14; Powell, supra note 143, at 124.
180. Segal, supra note 25.
181. Id.; Segal, supra note 177.
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evinced skilled and well-crafted arguments in favor of the client's po-
sition, but failed to fully and squarely present to the President his legal
options. 8 2 The WHC satisfied the duty to the client of zealous advo-
cacy, but failed to act as a proficient counselor and dispense candid
advice.'83 In doing so, the WHC breached its ethical duties by advanc-
ing positions directly contradictory to existing law, or unsupported by
legal authority, and providing the President with instructions on how
U.S. officials can evade liability for war crimes.
1. WHC's Position Misstated the Law or Was Unsupported
by Existing Law
As discussed above, Model Rule 8.4 prohibits a lawyer from en-
gaging in conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation.' 84
"Knowingly misstating facts or law.., is 'conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation '"1 85 and thus a violation of
Model Rule 8.4. A misstatement of law, whether "intentionally or
recklessly misleading," violates professional rules of conduct.'86 Ad-
ditionally, Model Rule 8.4 applies broadly to all aspects of a lawyer's
professional obligations and activities. 187 Therefore, this Rule would
apply to legal advice given by the WHC to the President.
Discipline Rule 7-102 of the Model Code provides that lawyers
must zealously advocate for their client, but in order to stay within the
bounds of the law, they must not knowingly advance a claim that is
not supported by existing law.'88 The lawyer, in fulfilling his profes-
sional obligations to the client, must not knowingly make a false
statement of law or fact'89 or advance a position not supported by cur-
rent law.
The President had a clear policy goal to violate the Geneva Con-
ventions and the WHC attempted to legally justify that policy goal.190
The WHC fulfilled its obligation to zealously fight for the client, but
182. See Segal, supra note 25; Powell, supra note 143, at 122, 24.
183. Segal, supra note 25.
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983).
185. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1985).
186. Id.
187. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-433 n.8 (2004).
188. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).
189. Id.
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in the process, the WHC "lawyers ... failed to meet their professional
obligations." 9'
The WHC advised the President that he has the constitutional au-
thority not to apply the GPW to al Qaeda and the Taliban,192 however
this advice contradicted the Constitution and Supreme Court prece-
dent. 193 The Constitution expressly grants to Congress the exclusive
power to regulate captures on land or water. 94 The Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Constitution in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. and re-
jected broad presidential authority to act in a role granted solely to
Congress. 95 Accordingly, the President does not have the constitu-
tional authority to regulate captures on land or water, 196 which in-
cludes detainees captured during times of war.
Advancing legal opinions contrary to the Constitution and Su-
preme Court precedent is dishonest and a misrepresentation of the
law. Thus, in advising the President that he could disregard the GPW,
the WHC delivered legal advice that was a dishonest misrepresenta-
tion of the law, in violation of Model Rule 8.4.
Further, the WHC advanced a position that was not supported by
existing law. 197 If a position is not supported by existing law, or one
which "misstates" the law, it is considered a "false opinion,"' 98 which
in turn violates Discipline Rule 7-102 of the Model Code. By misrep-
resenting Supreme Court precedent, the WHC advanced a legally in-
accurate opinion in violation of Discipline Rule 7-102.
The WHC also opined that the GPW does not apply to al Qaeda
and the Taliban, because (1) "the war on terrorism is a new kind of
war"; (2) the "Taliban... [is] not a government, but a militant, terror-
ist-like group"; and (3) "Afghanistan is a failed state and the Taliban
"did not exercise full control over the territory and people."'"
191. Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 2.
192. WHC Memo, supra note 18.
193. Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 2 ("[The memo] directly contradicts sev-
eral major Supreme Court decisions . . . and specific provisions of the Constitution itself.");
see also Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 690-91 ("[T]he memoranda's contention ... is le-
gally untenable in view of the Constitution[] ... and ... the Supreme Court's landmark deci-
sion in [Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)].). See generally
Paust, supra note 25.
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
195. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
196. Id.
197. See Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 690-91 ("[T]he memoranda's contention...
is legally untenable in view of the Constitution's express grant to Congress ....")
198. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1985).
199. See WHC Memo, supra note 18.
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However, the provision of the WHC Memo that advised the Presi-
dent the GPW may not apply to terrorists in the war against terror is
inconsistent with the international law of the GPW. Even if the Tali-
ban and al Qaeda are militant, terrorist like groups, the GPW applies
to all conflicts and all fighters across the globe. 21 There are no groups
of fighters or persons that are not covered under the GPW.20 1 Further,
the contention that Afghanistan was a failed state contradicts the offi-
cial United States position.2 °2
The WHC's justifications were erroneous and misstated the law.
"Knowingly misstating .. .law . . . is ... [a] misrepresentation. '"2 3
Since these statements and opinions misrepresented the official U.S.
position, 204 the WHC acted in violation of Model Rule 8.4.
Additionally, Disciplinary Rule 7-102 states that a lawyer may
advance a claim contrary to existing law if he has a good faith justifi-
cation for the modification.2 5 Stating that terrorists do not fall into
any category protected by the GPW is not currently supported by any
legal authority. Yoo argued that terrorists are not fighting on behalf of
any nation and therefore are illegal enemy combatants not protected
by the GPW.216 However, there are many who believe that there is no
person or conflict that is not covered under the Geneva Conven-
tions.20 7 It is difficult to determine if the WHC's argument will suffice
as a good faith justification to avoid a violation of Disciplinary Rule
7-102.
2. WHC May Not Counsel a Client on How to Evade Prosecution
Under Domestic or International Law for War Crimes
A lawyer must walk a fine line between giving an opinion on a
proposed action's legal consequences and giving an analysis on how
200. See Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 1; see also Mayer, supra note 13, at
112-14; Paust, supra note 23, at 511-12.
201. See Mayer, supra note 13, at 112-14; see also Paust, supra note 158, at 5; Law-
yers' Statement, supra note 116, at 1; Powell, supra note 143, at 125.
202. Mayer, supra note 13, at 112; Powell, supra note 143, at 124.
203. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1985).
204. Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from "en-
gaging in conducting involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." MODEL RuLES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983). "Knowingly misstating facts or law.., is 'conduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation ....' ABA opinion 346. Therefore,
a knowing misstatement of law violates Rule 8.4.
205. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980).
206. Mayer, supra note 13, at 112.
207. See Lawyers' Statement, supra note 116, at 1; Mayer, supra note 13, at 112-14;
Paust, supra note 23, at 511-12.
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the client may engage in unlawful conduct with impunity. 08 Model
Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from advising a client on how to violate
or evade the law.209 However, the legal advice of the WHC illustrates
a common plan to develop a legal framework to shield U.S. officials
and nationals from domestic criminal prosecution for war crimes.
2 0
Here, the WHC advised the President that if he simply did not ap-
ply the GPW to the Taliban, then U.S. officials could not be prose-
cuted for war crimes committed against the Taliban.2 11  This legal
opinion provided a defense for anyone charged with a war crime.21 2 A
war crime under the WCA is defined as a grave violation of the
GPW.21 3 If the GPW does not apply to the Taliban, there can not be a
violation of the WCA against the Taliban.
Liability for war crimes under domestic law has been tested and it
has been successfully evaded. Over twenty-five prisoners have died
in American custody; torture by U.S. servicemen is the suspected
cause."' One soldier who chained an Afghan prisoner to the ceiling
and kicked and beat him until he died was charged with manslaugh-
ter.215 Twenty-one soldiers have been listed for prosecution relating to
other torture-inflicted deaths but have only been charged with murder,
negligent homicide, and assault.216 These deaths may have resulted
from torture, a grave breach of the GPW, and should be actionable
under the WCA.217 Therefore, U.S. servicemen can commit, and have
committed, war crimes against the Taliban without violating the
WCA. The WHC manufactured a legal route for U.S. servicemen to
commit war crimes and avoid domestic criminal prosecution, 218 thus
violating Model Rule 1.2(d).
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983).
209. Id.
210. See Paust, supra note 108; see also Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 694; Lewis,
supra note 20.
211. WHC Memo, supra note 18.
212. Id.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2005).
214. Jehl & Schmitt, supra note 16.
215. Id.
216. Jehl, supra note 16. In another death caused by torture, a soldier lifted an Iraqi to
his feet by a baton held to his throat. Id. This man was not charged with any crime. Id.
Also, sixteen other soldiers were not prosecuted at all for the death of three prisoners. Id. In
one of the deaths, the soldier was not charged because he had not been "well informed of the
rules of engagement." Id.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
218. See Paust, supra note 108; Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 690-95; Lewis, supra
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C. Conflicts of Interest Inherent in the WHC
The WHC's duty to zealously advocate for the client often over-
powers the duty to provide independent and objective legal advice.219
The WHC must further the interests and policies of the President, but
since sound legal advice "can be a political disaster, the presidential
counsel constantly sacrifices legal ground for political advantage. 221
For the WHC, the duty to provide objective legal advice is often
trumped by the President's need for legal advice that furthers his pol-
icy goals.221
The ethical duty to remain objective and independent may be sub-
verted by the strong loyalty to the President.2 2 John W. Dean, a for-
mer WHC lawyer to Richard M. Nixon, pled guilty to a felony charge
of obstructing justice and defrauding the United States for his activi-
ties in the Watergate cover-up. 223 Dean claims that many illegal acts
were committed out of loyalty to the President. 24  Those who were
loyal to Nixon were loyal to the President they thought he was, or
could be, not the dishonest and corrupt President that he was.22 5
Nixon was forced to resign only after he lost the loyalty and support
of his staff at the White House.226
A President has the ability to attract dangerous loyalty that can
lead to compromising ethical duties, "because of the commanding
aura of his high office. ' 2 27 Egil "Bud" Krogh, a White House assistant
who pled guilty to charges stemming from a burglary, illustrated it
well: "Nixon, to me, was much larger than life. He was a huge, al-
219. See Bendavid, supra note 37. See generally Wang, supra note 29 (discussing the
position of the WHC lawyer).
220. Bendavid, supra note 37.
221. See id.
222. See id. A professor of political science at the University of Texas, stated that Al-
berto Gonzales was selected be head of the WHC because he has the "potential for loyalty."
Charlie Savage, Nominee Benefits from Friends in High Places, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 7, 2005,
at 5. Professor Bruce Buchanan suggests that Gonzales was an unknown Texas lawyer who
has risen to public office as a result of his connections to the "Bush family [political] ma-
chine." Id. For an interesting look into the background of Gonzales, including his accepting
of campaign contributions for re-election to the Texas Supreme Court from Enron while they
were appearing before his court, see id.
223. Dean Disbarred in Virginia for "Unethical Acts," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1975, at A19.
224. Dean, supra note 39, at 621.
225. Id. at 620-21 ("Today it is clear that Richard Nixon and his White House were cor-
rupt, dishonest and venal ... .
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most mythic being when I first went to work there. I guess the word is
awe, both for him and his office. 221
Certainly all Presidents understand the commanding authority and
allegiance that their high office commands and use them effectively. 229
Nixon was able to use the power of his office to command "blind loy-
alty" from the attorneys in the WHC, who in turn committed illegal
acts.23° Some of the lawyers did not perceive any wrongdoing simply
because they were doing their job "in service of the President, or at his
direct request. 231
The problem of blind loyalty with the WHC is compounded by
the lack of accountability. The lawyers of the WHC have an obliga-
tion to abide by the Constitution and other applicable laws when ren-
dering advice to the President, but there is practically no review of
their opinions. 32 The WHC lawyers "rarely" face consequences for
their conduct and are effectively shielded from any penalties.233 Al-
though WHC lawyers' theories are subject to review, governmental
agencies, national courts, and Congress all give great deference to
their opinions.2 34 Furthermore, the zealous advocacy of the WHC is
not counterbalanced by an adversary. 235 In reality, there is no "safety
net" to mandate respect for the law or international legal order except
for the professional integrity of these lawyers.236 In essence, the only
checks on the actions of the WHC are the President and the lawyers
themselves.
Because of the many conflicts of interest, and the minimal safe-
guards on their behavior, the WHC must be held accountable to the
rules governing professional responsibility. Recognizing that the
WHC lawyer is "always buffeted by the powerful crosswinds of poli-
tics, ethics, loyalty and the law-winds that often push him in oppos-
ing directions," 237 the rules of professional responsibility provide the





232. See Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 693.
233. See Segal, supra note 25.
234. Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 693.
235. Segal, supra note 25.
236. Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 693.
237. Wang, supra note 29, at 117 (quoting Bendavid, supra note 37). Bendavid states:
"You represent the president, but also the institution of the presidency. Your advice must be
legally sound, but also politically astute. Your job is to provide ethical guidance, but also to
keep your boss happy." Bendavid, supra note 37.
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of the WHC are subject to the disciplinary rules in the state where
they are licensed to practice, and they must be held accountable to
these rules.238
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FROM NEW ZEALAND
The WHC has a very difficult job. The WHC must advise the
President on the legality of certain issues; but there are political pres-
sures to reach conclusions that further the policy goals of the Presi-
dent. The WHC must be loyal to the goals of the President, but this
loyalty can cause conflicts between adhering to the ethical duties of a
lawyer and providing the client with the legal framework to institute
his policies. The WHC could be more effective if the pressure of loy-
alty was lifted.239 To provide effective and ethical representation to
the President, the WHC must evolve into an institution similar to the
top legal advisor of the executive branch in New Zealand. The final
part of this Comment will look at the New Zealand model of provid-
ing the executive branch with independent legal advice.
A. The Legal Advisory Department to the Executive Branch
in New Zealand
New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy consisting of a parlia-
mentary government. 24  The Queen of New Zealand is the formal
head of state and the Governor-General represents the crown, but their
duties are mostly ceremonial.24' The Prime Minister is the head of the
executive branch and his appointed cabinet,242 while the Parliament
has the power to make the laws.243
The Solicitor General is the chief legal advisor to the government
of New Zealand and an officer of the executive branch.2' The other
law officer of the government is the Attorney General, who is ap-
pointed by the Prime Minister and is a member of his cabinet and Par-
238. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2002).
239. "Those who've emerged from the crucible of the office say the pressures can make
decisions agonizingly difficult." Bendavid, supra note 37. "In the case of government law-
yers providing advice to policy-makers, the counseling model of lawyering is clearly better
than the advocacy model." Segal, supra note 177.
240. See GEOFFREY PALMER & MATrHEW PALMER, BRIDLED POWER 3 (1997).
241. See id. at 40-41.
242. Id. at 52.
243. Id. at 128.
244. John McGrath, Principles for Sharing Law Officer Power: The Role of the New
Zealand Solicitor-General, 18 N.Z. U. L. REv. 197, 207-08 (1998).
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liament.245 The Attorney General is a legal advisor to the government
and is responsible for seeing that the government is managed in com-
pliance with the law.24
The Solicitor General is the head of the Crown Law Office
(CLO).24 7 The two primary goals of the CLO are to ensure that the ac-
tions of the executive government are lawful and that the government
is not prevented from lawfully implementing its policies. 248 The client
of the Solicitor General is the government.24 9 The Solicitor General
advises the Prime Minister and the departments of the government on
a variety of public functions, including the actions of the government,
the constitutionality of its policies, and the relationships between the
departments. 250
The office of the Solicitor General was created in 1875 in re-
sponse to concerns that the Attorney General would be unable to offer
legal advice independent of political considerations. 251 The Crown
recognized the importance of independent legal thought and realized
that the arguments of the Attorney General would be shaped by the
government's interests. The concern over the tension between holding
a political office and the "duty to act independent[] of political con-
siderations" in dispensing legal advice to the government, led to the
creation of the non-political office of the Solicitor General.252 The So-
licitor General was created to be a non-political legal advisor to
counter the inherent political bias of the Attorney General as a politi-
cal officer.253
The Solicitor General and the WHC have much the same func-
tions. Both render legal advice to the executive branch in "the zone
where ... law and policy [converge]" and often conflict.254 Like the
245. Id. at 198; see RCHARD MULGAN, POLITICS IN NEW ZEALAND 75 (2d ed. 1997).
246. McGrath, supra note 244, at 203.
247. Id. at 200.
248. Id. at 214; CROWN LAW OFFICE STATEMENT OF INTENT 2 (2005), available at
http://crownlaw.govt.nz/artman/docs/catindex-7.asp.
249. McGrath, supra note 244, at 207.
250. Id. at 208; John McGrath, The Crown, the Parliament and the Government, 7
WAIKATO L. REv. 1, 2 (1999).
251. McGrath, supra note 244, at 197-98.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 201 (stating that the appointment of a non-political Solicitor General was
certainly related to the political office of Attorney General). See generally Crown Law Of-
fice, Historical Information, GOVT.NZ, at http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/pagepub/docs/about/
historical.asp (last visited Dec. 6, 2005).
254. McGrath, supra note 244, at 208 (discussing Solicitor General); CROWN LAW
OFFICE STATEMENT OF INTENT, supra note 248, at 2 (discussing Solicitor General); Bendavid,
supra note 37 (discussing the WHC).
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WHC, the Solicitor General advances the interests of the executive
branch.255 However, the latter does not advance the government's po-
sition if "it can clearly be discredited. 256 The Solicitor General al-
ways keeps the interest of the state in mind, but "the highest value is
in maintaining the integrity of the law. 257 The Solicitor General rec-
ognizes that the best interests of the Crown are not always in "the nar-
row interests of the government of the day or the bureaucracy which
supports it.''258 Needless to say, the Solicitor General's popularity on
legal advice will inevitably "swing wildly. 259
The significant difference between the CLO and the WHC is that
the former is an independent government office.26  The latter is more
akin to New Zealand's Attorney General, since both are politically ac-
countable. The established constitutional practice in New Zealand is
that the Solicitor General and the CLO are non-political officers a.2 6  It
is well recognized in New Zealand that the duties exercised by the
CLO require independence from the current government.262 The CLO
operates with less direction from the state so the possibility of influ-
ence is dramatically less than it is for the WHC.
The politically independent nature of the office is well estab-
lished. The Solicitor General is appointed by the Governor-General at
255. CROWN OFFICE STATEMENT OF INTENT, supra note 248, at 2 (discussing the role of
the Solicitor General); Wang, supra note 29, at 125 (discussing the role of the WHC).
256. Id. at 207.
257. McGrath, supra note 244, at 208.
258. Id. at 207.
259. Id. at 208.
260. Id. at 200; McGrath, supra note 250, at 2; The White House, White House Offices,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/off-descrp.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (listing the
office of the WHC as a "White House Office," indicating that the office falls within the ex-
ecutive branch and is not an independent office).
261. McGrath, supra note 244, at 198.
262. Id. New Zealand has a judicial system that is also independent with judges who
are appointed and have life tenure. MULGAN, supra note 245, at 169-70. They have lower
courts of general jurisdiction, the District Courts, an intermediary appellate court called the
High Court, and a Court of Appeals, which, as the name suggests, takes appeals from the
judgments rendered by the lower courts. Id. The final judicial authority rests with the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council in London. Id. at 170. The justices of the Court of Ap-
peal and the High Court, unlike the District Courts, are appointed and tenured. Id. The CLO,
and the Solicitor General, is also an independent institution, but provides legal advice to the
executive branch so the legality of a policy or action may be advised upon before it is test dur-
ing a lengthy court process. McGrath, supra note 244, at 208. An independent WHC may
look similar to the United States Supreme Court, but an independent WHC would be more
efficient in rendering unbiased policy advice than waiting for a ruling from the Supreme
Court. Also, the WHC would be able to give advisory opinions whereas the Supreme Court
cannot.
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the "prerogative" of the Crown, and the position is permanent. 263 The
Solicitor General is free from political responsibilities and is able to
form legal arguments without having to determine if they are congru-
ent with the policy or preferred arguments of the executive branch.2 64
The CLO is beyond suspicion of party bias. 265 The independence en-
joyed by the CLO is the freedom from conforming to the political per-
spective of the party in power.266 Moreover, the CLO has the freedom
to advise the executive government on the application of the law, as
viewed by the CLO.267
B. Application of the New Zealand Model
The structure of the WHC must be modified and follow the lead
of New Zealand to make the WHC an independent government
agency.268 Over a century ago, New Zealand recognized it was impos-
sible to expect sound legal advice from a politically accountable law-
yer, and so it chose to make its top legal advisor independent. 269 The
United States must follow the example of New Zealand because the
WHC faces the same political pressures as the former Attorney Gen-
eral of New Zealand. The United States is the world's biggest super-
power and its policy decisions undeniably affect the entire world
community; thus, it has a greater responsibility to ensure the legality
of those decisions. Just as the U.S. judiciary functions as an inde-
pendent check on the other two branches, a CLO-type WHC would
function as an independent unit immune from the political pressures
that influenced one WHC lawyer to turn the United States onto a path
263. McGrath, supra note 244, at 201; McGrath, supra note 250, at 2.
264. Id. at 207.
265. See id. at 200 (stating that the CLO is an independent government agency).
266. Id. at 216.
267. McGrath, supra note 244, at 216; see CROWN LAW OFFICE STATEMENT OF INTENT,
supra note 248, at 3.
268. "In the case of government lawyers providing advice to policy-makers, the coun-
seling model of lawyering is clearly better than the advocacy model." Segal, supra note 25.
The New Zealand model of an independent advisor to the executive branch encompasses the
counseling model of lawyering, whereas the current WHC is closer to an advocacy model and
resulted in the WHC Memo.
269. McGrath, supra note 244, at 197 ("[T]here is increasing concern over the tension
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of torture, 270 which has caused nearly thirty deaths 271 and the condem-
nation of the world community.272
If the WHC position was permanent and did not simply change
with every new President, then the WHC would not suffer from the
political pressures currently inherent in the position.273 Independent
and objective advice is required from the WHC, but compliance with
these ethical duties may not be possible for the WHC in the current
political landscape.274 The duty to the President as a client, coupled
with the duty to zealously advocate for the President, make compli-
ance with the duty to remain independent and objective nearly impos-
sible. If the WHC does not furnish the legal advice or the legal justi-
fication for the policies the President wants, then the President may
simply find another lawyer who will. 275
The WIHC Memo is a good example of how the President can
elicit legally unsound advice from the WHC simply to further his
policies. If the WHC was an independent agency, with the same du-
ties to the client and of zealous advocacy, would the lawyer reach the
same conclusions as this WHC? Would the lawyer advocate for the
legal justification for torture and provide a road map to commit war
crimes with impunity? I think not.
CONCLUSION
The now-common practice of torture by U.S. officials and nation-
als is morally repugnant and illegal under domestic and international
law. 276  The WHC in charge of interpreting the law in the WHC
Memo did not fulfill their obligations of professional responsibility.
The professional conflicts inherent in the WHC position make it
nearly impossible to render legally sound advice while keeping the
President happy. Loyalty to the President can create professional con-
270. See Mark Danner, supra note 25 ("[A] path the Bush Administration set... has
transformed the United States from a country that condemned torture and forbade its use to
one that practices torture routinely.").
271. Jehl, supra note 16; Jehl & Schmitt, supra note 16.
272. See Bilder & Vagts, supra note 1, at 690; Paust, supra note 108 ("[T]here is evi-
dence of a Common Plan to violate the 1949 Geneva Conventions.").
273. See Bendavid, supra note 37. See generally Wang, supra note 29 (discussing the
legal and ethical duties of the WIC).
274. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983); Bendavid, supra note 37.
275. Goldfarb, supra note 30.
276. However, apparently the Bush Administration claims, despite recent "reports of
secret CIA prisons where terrorism detainees might have been mistreated," "the United States
is the world leader on human rights." Associated Press, U.S. Leads the Way on Human
Rights, White House Says, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 3, 2005, at A9. "'The president has
made it very clear that we do not torture, he would never condone torture or authorize the use
of torture."' Id. (quoting White House press secretary Scott McClellan).
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flicts of interest. The United States should look to the New Zealand
model of providing the government legal advice and establish a legal
advisor independent of the executive branch. Without independent
thought, the WHC may continue to advance legally unsound argu-
ments to further the policies of the President, possibly to the detriment
of the people of the United States and the world community.
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